The Failing Company Doctrine by Blum, Marc P
Boston College Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 2
11-1-1974
The Failing Company Doctrine
Marc P. Blum
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc P. Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C.L. Rev. 75 (1974),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol16/iss1/2
THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE
MARC P. BLUM*
INTRODUCTION
The failing company doctrine, an antitrust defense, has never
shaken free of the quirks surrounding its creation. Essentially, the
doctrine allows a company in grave probability of business failure to
complete an otherwise illegal merger, provided no alternate good
faith purchaser exists. The doctrine's impending demise has been
perceived for a generation; yet conclusions drawn from a remark-
able legal history and explored in the first section of this article
demonstrate the doctrine's viability.
The application of this defense enhances fluidity of capital
markets. As one factor in minimizing investment losses, it spurs
competition by aiding market entry of new business ventures.
Moreover, antitrust abuses perceived to be connected with the doc-
trine are shown to be insubstantial.
Following the discussion of the judicial development of the
doctrine, the last two sections of the article provide a foundation for
a new and vigorous role for the failing company doctrine. A proce-
dure for the prediction of business failure is presented. A model
based on publicly available accounting and market data from 230
businesses is shown by computerized validation tests to be approxi-
mately 94% accurate in predicting business failure. Finally a deci-
sion framework is outlined that could be used to connect the model
of business failure to failing company doctrine decisions. The deci-
sion framework yields a novel perspective of the nature of the
concept "failing." This perspective resolves the doctrine's congenital
puzzle by defining explicitly that level of probability of business
failure which is sufficiently "grave" to justify allowing the failing
company defense.
I. LEGAL HISTORY AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
A. The Original Litigation
International Shoe v. FTC' is, not only the case of origin of the
failing company doctrine, but is also a landmark decision which has
been neither significantly improved upon nor rejected despite a half
century of endeavors in both directions. A review of the factual
setting of this case will: (1) aid resolution of contemporary issues
concerning the doctrine's status as an absolute defense; (2) suggest a
possible redefinition of failure; (3) demonstrate the importance of
proving absence of alternate, good faith purchasers; and (4) indicate
* B.A., Yale University, 1964; LL.B., Columbia University, 1967; Ph.D., Columbia
University, 1969; Certified:Public Accountant; Associate, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoff-
berger & Hollander, Baltimore Md.
' 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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the nature of economic purposes served, as compared with antitrust
abuses risked by the application of the doctrine.
The merger of International Shoe with the W. H. McElwain
Company on May 11, 1921, accomplished by International Shoe's
purchase of McElwain's stock, combined the largest and sixth
largest shoe manufacturers in the United States. The Supreme Court
upheld the merger on two alternative grounds: the corporations
were found not to be in "substantial competition," 2 an acceptable
defense under the pre-1950 formulation of the Clayton Act; 3
 and
existing competition would have been eliminated without the merger
since McElwain was failing. 4 .
The Clayton Act had been construed to apply only to sales of
stock and not to sales of assets. Nevertheless, International Shoe's
president, Frank C. Rand, arguing that the form of a transaction
should not be determinative, sought to persuade the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) that application of the Clayton Act to Interna-
tional Shoe's purchase of McElwain's stock was unreasonable. In-
ternational Shoe chose not to follow the legally acceptable route of a
purchase of assets because of ostensibly human considerations. In
his testimony, Rand declared "a further and bigger purpose of
saving something for a group of fine men, that we had known very
pleasantly for years, and not have the whole crowd and group turn
out dead broke, without a single cent. . . ."5 He therefore rejected a
purchase- of assets because it would "break the morale of the
organization" 6 and he could not hope to run McElwain in associa-
tion with a "broke and helpless" management.' Because of this
beneficent gesture, the FTC was asked to overlook the "technical"
violation of the Clayton Act.
What was the advantage to McElwain's management of a
purchase of stock rather than assets? McElwain's net equity, or total
assets minus total liabilities, was, at book value, $9,923,087.75 on
April 30, and $8,710,763.30 on May 31, 1921, with book values
exceeding realizable values by more than $2,000,000.00. 8 The
merger occurred on May 11. Capital structure included $6,993,100
2
 Id. at 298-99.
Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
4
 Questions have been raised as to whether International Shoe rests on two independent
holdings, or whether the first holding converts the second into dictum. The majority, how-
ever, clearly intended more than a single holding: "Since, in our opinion, these grounds are
determinative, we find it unnecessary to consider ... other contentions .... For the reasons
appearing under each of the two foregoing heads of this opinion, the judgment below must be
reversed." 280 U.S. at 303. Contra, United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1281, 1308
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
5
 Record at 47, International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
6 Id.
Id. at 46-52, 82, 299.
8 Id. at 81, 209, 313.
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par value of first preferred stock (publicly held), $2,600,000 in
second preferred (owned by McElwain employees and manage-
ment), and $3,494,800 in common stock (mainly held by McElwain
management). 9 Since preferred stock claims had priority for
$9,600,000 plus dividend arrearages, McElwain's losses had clearly
eliminated common stockholders' equity. A reorganization might
have removed their last vestige of ownership rights. McElwain's
management thought publication of financial statements for the
fiscal year ending May 31, 1921, would so increase creditors' pres-
sure that first preferred dividends would have to be omitted, 1 °
which would have given control to owners of first preferred."
International Shoe bailed out McElwain's management by requiring
its $9,464,837.50 payment to be allocated among the three classes of
stock-171/2% of par was sacrificed by first preferred ($1,220,000)
and 25% by second preferred ($650,000), leaving common with 50%
of par value.' 2 Thus the landmark case which first recognized the
failing company defense arose out of connivance and coincidence.
Had International Shoe chosen to purchase McElwain's assets,
rather than its management-owned common stock, no judicial ini-
tiative would have been required to sanction the merger.
Interpretation of the issues presented by International Shoe
changed as litigation proceeded. The initial contention relied on at
the Federal Trade Commission hearing was that International Shoe
had freed itself of the taint of purchasing McElwain's stock by
means of a sale with Bennett Limited, a Canadian Corporation,
whereby Bennett bought McElwain's stock, immediately resold the
assets to International Shoe and made no profit on the deal.' 3
Skirting perjury, International Shoe and McElwain executives
admitted that the purpose of the above subterfuge was to show that
International Shoe had never been interested in owning McElwain's
stock, but merely sought to own all of its operating assets and save
the wealth of its management.' 4
 The essence of their argument was
9
 International Shoe v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518, 521, 523 (1st Cir. 1928); Record, supra note 5,
at 527 (FTC findings).
'° Record, supra note 5, at 293.
" See generally Moody's Manual (1921).
12
 29 F.2d at 521, 523.
The common stock then had the voting power and was held mostly by the executive
forces; the purchaser wanted, for obvious business reasons, to retain the effective
managerial forces of this concern in good courage and friendly attitude, when
undertaking long-distance management of the McElwain Company's great business.
The motives on both sides to put through a merger so advantageous to voters in the
selling company are obvious.
Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
13
 Record, supra note 5 at 46-52, 119.20, 127.
14
 280 U.S. at 301; Record, supra note 5, at 72, 109, 231, 237, 242, 275-76, 280, 282,
336, and 541 (FTC's opinion). See also 9 F.T.C. 441, 461 (1925). Contra, International Shoe
v. FTC, 29 F.2d at 523. The Supreme Court supported International Shoe:
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that the Clayton Act was so openly evaded by sales of assets that
enforcement was unfair since it depended merely on the form of
transactions. 15
The next defense was that International Shoe and McElwain
were not "in substantial competition." International Shoe was the
largest shoe manufacturer in the country; McElwain was the sixth
largest nationally and the largest in New England, a regional mar-
ket not heavily penetrated by International Shoe." The Supreme
Court had evolved a rule that if no substantial competition had
occurred between merging companies, competition in general could
not be substantially lessened by allowing the merger."
However flawed the assumption be that merger of non-
competitors could not lessen competition, its invocation could save
the International Shoe-McElwain merger only if the Supreme Court
made independent factual findings and reversed the FTC's finding.
The agency, affirmed by the First Circuit," had held that Interna-
tional Shoe and McElwain were in substantial competition." To
support its conclusion that the companies were not in substantial
competition, the Supreme Court relied exclusively upon the opinion
of McElwain's management: 2 °
[T]he officers, stockholders and creditors, thoroughly
familiar with the factors of a critical situation and more
able than commission or court to foresee future contingen-
cies, after much consideration, felt compelled to choose the
alternative of sale to International. There is no reason to
doubt that in so doing they exercised a judgment which
was both honest and well-informed; and if aid be needed to
fortify their conclusion, it may be found in the familiar
The transaction took the form of a sale of stock instead of the assets, not, as the
evidence clearly establishes, because of any desire or intention to thereby affect
competition, but because by that means the personnel and organization of the
McElwain factories could be retained, which for reasons that seem satisfactory, was
regarded as vitally important. It is perfectly plain from all the evidence that the
controlling purpose of International in making the purchase in question was to
secure additional factories, which it could not itself build with sufficient speed to
meet the pressing requirements of its business.
280 U.S. at 301.
15
 See Record, supra note 5, passim.
16
 Id. at 353, 376.
17
 280 U.S. at 297-98. In addition, in International Shoe, the Court read the "rule of
reason," earlier inserted into the Sherman Act, into § 7 of the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act
was thereby held to bar a lessening of competition in a substantial degree, "that is to say, to
such a degree as will injuriously affect the public . . . [T]he public interest is not concerned
in the lessening of competition, which, to begin with, is itself without real substance." 280
U.S. at 298. See note 44 infra for a discussion of the "rule of reason."
" 29 F.2d 518 (1st Cir, 1928), afrg International Shoe Co., 9 F.T.C. 441 (1914).
16
 9 F.T.C. 441, 453 (1914).
2° 280 U.S. at 297, citing FTC v. Curtis Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
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presumption of rightfulness which attaches to human con-
duct in general. 2 '
Perhaps to bolster this conclusion because the substantial com-
petition issue had been resolved by a de novo appellate finding of
fact, the majority added an alternative holding—that even had
substantial competition been present, it would have ended with the
failure of McElwain. 22 This argument had been asserted throughout
all stages of the litigation, but solely as a secondary line of defense.
The three dissenting justices argued that the FTC's inferences
concerning the presence of substantial competition and the failure of
McElwain in the sense that it was about to go out of existence were
reasonable. 23
[McElwain's business,] conducted either through a receiv-
ership or a reorganized company, would probably continue
to compete with that of [International. . . . McElwain's
going concern value was sufficiently high to prevent its
being dismantled and, anyhow] there was evidence that
the depression in the shoe trade in 1920-1921 was then a
passing phase of the business. 24
The Court did not reverse the FTC's finding that McElwain
was solvent under the Federal Bankruptcy Act test. 25 Rather,
McElwain was found to be "in failing circumstances," 26 as revealed
by analysis of financial and economic factors beyond those disclosed
on the corporate balance sheet for the years 1920 - 21. These factors
were: a severe decline in shoe prices from the 1920 high; cancellation
of old, and a dearth of new orders; losses of about $8,000,000 during
the fiscal year ending May 31, 1921, an amount twice the book
value of common equity on May 31, 1920; increasing debt—totaling
$15,000,000 owed to 63 bank and trust companies on May 11, 1921,
or about 60% of total assets at book value; production reduced to
15 -20% of capacity; omission of dividends on second preferred and
on common stock; and testimony of McElwain's officers proclaiming
inability to meet near-future debts. 27
 The Supreme Court's emphasis
contrasts with that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
21 280 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added). The dissent felt that the five-member majority
should not have based reversal on the self-serving testimony of officers of International Shoe
and McElwain. Id. at 304-06. The majority had felt that this testimony was.sound "since
there is no „ . doubting the accuracy of observation or credibility of the witnesses . . . Id. at
299,
22 Id. at 301-02.
23 280 U.S. at 303.
24 Id. at 306.
25 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
26 280 U.S. at 301.
27
 Record, supra note 5, at 105, 313, 318, and 524 (FTC findings).
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which had stated that "[w]hile . . McElwain . . . had suffered
substantial losses . . . , there is no foundation whatever for [Interna-
tional Shoe's] contention that (except for this purchase) the concern
would have gone out of existence. . ." 28
Under the Supreme Court's holding, which constituted the ini-
tial judicial formulation of the failing company doctrine, a company
need not be insolvent or certain to go out of existence. It need be
in a slightly less serious, but ambiguous, plight—"in failing circum-
stances," where "recovery ... to a normal condition was, to say the
least, in gravest doubt. . . ."29 In addition, the competitor merging
with the failing company must be "the only available purchaser." 3°
The First Circuit had found three alternatives to allowing the
McElwain merger. Bank creditors could have continued to carry the
failing company. Between 1920 and 1922, banks were carrying
other businesses and there existed "practically a conceded
moratorium" 31 as to many business loans. Had McElwain gone into
receivership, competition would have been preserved and probably
intensified. 32 If bankruptcy had occurred, owners of one or both
classes of preferred stock "would in their own interest have taken
over the property, kept it in active operation, and therefore in
competition. "33
The First Circuit opinion here supports the FTC's conclusion
that since McElwain was worth so much more as a going concern.
than as scrap, the owners of its preferred stock would have kept the
company in the market:
To hold ... that the [FTC] was bound to draw the
inference that the McElwain Company's financial condi-
tion was such that it would have ceased to be a competitor
of the International in the shoe business, would be for the
court, ultra vires, to substitute a highly speculative
prophecy for the commission's fair and soundly-grounded
contrary inference. 34
The Supreme Court noted the suggestions, but dismissed them
as "lying wholly within the realm of speculation."35 The idea that
banks might carry McElwain was equated with further borrowing
that might have been crushing. 36 The Court went on to note that as
is 29 F.2d at 521.
29 280 U.S. at 301.
3° Id..
31 29 F.2d at 522.
32 Id.
13 Id.
34 Id.
35 280 U.S. at 301-02.
34 Id. at 301.
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to McElwain's survival, one guess was as good as another. 37 Re-
ceivership was not absolutely certain to lead to McElwain's recov-
ery; and upon bankruptcy, owners of the preferred might have
liquidated rather than continued the business."
From the difference in approach between the First Circuit and
the Supreme Court, the failing company doctrine emerges with
deceiving concreteness: a merger otherwise illegal because of an-
ticompetitive effects is allowable if one of the merging companies
was failing and if there was no• other good faith purchaser. The
Supreme Court articulated this thought in language that has become
the hallmark of the doctrine:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation
with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilita-
tion so remote that it faced the grave probability of a
business failure with resulting. loss to its stockholders and
injury to the communities where its plants were operated,
we hold that the purchase of its capital stock by a com-
petitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not
with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the
accumulated business of the purchaser and with the effect
of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise
probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the
public and does not substantially lessen competition or
restrain commerce within the intent of the Clayton Act. To
regard such a transaction as a violation of law, as this
court suggested in United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., ..
would seem a distempered view of purchase and result. 39
International Shoe is commonly cited as the point of origin of the
failing company doctrine. Earlier traces can be found in the two
decisions relied on by the Court, but these cases in turn cite no
precedent.
American Press Association v. United States," presented a
duopoly, a market consisting of only two firms, American Press
Association and Western Newspaper Union. The plate business of
37 Id.
36 Id. at 301-02.
39 280 U.S. at 302-03. The usual wording of the quote is grave "probability," although
"possibility" is used by at least one printing of Lawyer's Edition, 74 L.Ed. 431, 443 (1930),
and by the FTC, Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274, 1409 (1960); United States Steel
Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1281 (1968). The distinction is that "possibility" is an event that can
happen; "probability" is the likelihood of the event. Thus, the possibility of business failure is
by definition grave, and is ever-present, no matter how unlikely. The context would seem to
imply correctness of the usual wording, "probability," as would FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 56 (1948).
40 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
81
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
American Press Association, apparently once its principal source of
income, was sustaining such steadily increasing losses that any
improvement of prospects was precluded. 4 ' Its directors had de-
cided to dispose of its plate plant for scrap value if the court held its
sale as a going concern to Western Newspaper Union illegal. 42
The Seventh Circuit applied the Sherman Act 43 as "measured
by the rule of reason"44 to allow the sale of assets and business by
American Press. The court concluded that the purpose of the Sher-
man Act was to prevent injury to the public and that this "joinder of
competing business" 45 would probably not injure the public because
even if the sale were disallowed, Western would still survive as a
monopolist capable of buying up the plant piecemeal." Scrapping
the plant would add to Western's cost of reorganizing American's
former business, a task which would have been undertaken in any
event. A refusal to approve the sale would have: (1) left newspapers
serviced by American in an inconvenient position and prey to losses;
(2) reduced the recovery value of the plant to American's sharehol-
ders; and (3) injured "the public [by] the destruction of a usable and
useful plant."'"
[A] law designed to shield the public from injury
should not be construed to compel the public to suffer an
injury. . . [T]he Sherman Law ... does not require the
stockholders of a company . . . to sustain a loss in 1917
arising with wrongdoing, if that loss can be prevented
without injury to the public. 48
The majority in International Shoe also relied on the 4-3 deci-
41
 Id. at 93.
42 Id.
43
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1- 7 ( 1 9 7 0).
44
 245 F. at 93. The birth of the rule of reason is usually credited to Standard Oil v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (19I1), but it was foreshadowed in earlier decisions and has been
subject to various interpretations. M. Handler, Trade Regulation 92 n.7, 99 n.11 (3d ed.
1960). The essence of the sometimes nefarious rule of reason is that "only those restraints upon
interstate commerce which are unreasonable are prohibited by the Sherman Law . . ."
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927), citing Standard Oil and
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Its effect is to vitiate the
Sherman Act's literal proscription of "restraints of trade" by using the common law definition
of that term to conclude that only unreasonable restraints are proscribed. By introducing this
subjective standard, the courts freed themselves from the strict statutory language to become
the arbiters of each antitrust case. While the origin of the rule of reason appears traceable to a
desire "to expand the grounds on which antitrust charges may be defended . . ., [the rule] also
reflects a justifiable fear of irrational results from too extensive a per se approach, a fear
which those who want an effective antitrust policy might well share." C. Kaysen & D.
Turner, Antitrust Policy 241 (1965).
45 245 F. at 73.
46 Id.
47 Id.
46 Id. at 93-94.
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sion rendered in United States v. United States Steel Corp." There
the government failed in an attempt to dissolve U.S. Steel in a
Sherman Act prosecution. In particular, U.S. Steel's acquisition of
Tennessee Coal & Iron was upheld as wholly in the public interest
because the latter was a failing company." U.S. Steel's operation of
the Tennessee Company was the sole means of bringing value to its
property and preventing it from becoming entirely worthless to
shareholders, financial institutions, and the communities in which it
was situated. 5 ' By the defendant's development of the property—as
opposed to allowing it to decay—"there would be profit to the
Corporation, but there would be profit as well to the world. For this
reason President Roosevelt sanctioned the purchase, and it would
seem a distempered view of purchase and result to regard them as
violations of the law." 52
A third case, Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson" was cited in
International Shoe's brief before the FTC. 54 In this case the Su-
preme Court affirmed a judgment of the Oklahoma Territory Su-
preme Court55 in favor of minority stockholders of failing Shawnee
Compress, who had sued to cancel a lease of the corporation's entire
property. No violation of a specific law (e.g., common law, territor-
ial antitrust act, or Sherman Act) was claimed by plaintiffs. 56 Pre-
sumably Shawnee was cited because, absent anticompetitive cove-
nants, a failing firm would have been allowed to lease its business to
a competitor.
The decision in International Shoe marked the birth of the
failing company doctrine. Although the subsequent development of
the doctrine has been neither rapid nor radical, changes have
49 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
5° Id. at 446-47.
5 ' Id.
32 Id. at 447, "[President Roosevelt's] approval, of course, did not make it legal, but it
gives assurance of its legality, and we know from his earnestness in the public welfare he
would have approved of nothing that had even a tendency to its detriment," Id. at 446.
sa 209 U.S. 423 (1907).
54 Record, supra note 5, at 557.
95 17 Okla. 231 (1906).
56 The territorial court upheld Shawnee's right to lease its entire business because it
could not "profitably continue operations." 209 U.S. at 433. But because of added anti-
competitive features Shawnee's lease was held cancellable:
It may be conceded that the evidence shows that the Shawnee Company was
financially embarrassed, and its condition might have justified a lease of its property
if that had been all it did. It, however . . . went out of the field of competition; it
covenanted not to enter into that field again, and it pledged itself to render every
assistance to prevent others from entering it. . . . [The lease] presents something
more than the lease of property by the Shawnee Company, induced or made
necessary by financial embarrassment. . . It presents acts in aid of a scheme of
monopoly.
Id. at 433-34.
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evolved. In order to appreciate their significance, it would be help-
ful to first examine the purposes of the doctrine.
B. Purposes of the Doctrine
In essence the doctrine serves two purposes: (1) granting mercy,
that is, avoiding needless injury while foregoing merely insubstan-
tial benefits to competition; and (2) spurring competition by aiding
market entry of small business and smoothing market exit for
inefficient businesses.
1. Mercy
The mercy function of the failing company doctrine has the
effect of avoiding needless injury with minimal anticompetitive ef-
fects. International Shoe's consideration of the possible harm that
would befall communities, employees, owners, and creditors as-
sociated with McElwain were it to go out of business, illustrates the
nature and significance of the mercy function. If McElwain had
liquidated and first preferred shareholders had received an indicated
25% of par value, second preferred and common would have re-
ceived nothing." Second preferred consisted of the life savings of
many of McElwain's employees as well as investments by manage-
ment. Although International Shoe Company went to extraordinary
lengths to protect McElwain's management, there is no indication
that the Court was predominantly concerned with losses to any
individual—manager, creditor, employee, or public investor. Losses
to these people were only a part of the potential harm.
Had McElwain merely entered a bankruptcy proceeding, many
banks would have faced the prospect of heavy loss, a consideration
which could have been a factor in triggering a bank panic at a time
of already severe economic depression. Besides $2,000,000 owed to
trade creditors, McElwain owed $15,000,000 to about 63 bank and
trust companies in New England, New York, Philadelphia, Cleve-
land, and Chicago."
The possibility of further price declines and employee layoffs in
the shoe industry, particularly in depressed New England where
McElwain's production facilities were concentrated, constituted
another element of potential harm. A dozen factories, with 6000
employees, might have been closed in New Hampshire. McElwain
was the largest employer in Newport and Merrimack, and the
second largest in Manchester, Nashua, and Claremont, and thus
57 Record at 76-78, 105-06, 580 (Exhibit), International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291
(1930).
55
 Id. at 295.
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accounted for the direct livelihood of about 20% of the inhabitants
of these cities. 59
The argument which can be made in behalf of the failing
company doctrine on the basis of its mercy function is com-
plemented by the fact that needless injury is avoided without sub-
stantially reducing competition. International Shoe demonstrated
that merger of a failing firm would not have a substantially adverse
anticompetitive effect because the firm would soon cease being a
competitor altogether. The Court did not say that there would be no
adverse competitive effect following the merger. Rather, the merger
"[w]as not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and did
not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the
intent of the Clayton Act.""
Merger of a failing firm would be expected to have no anticom-
petitive effect only if the relevant market were that of a classic
duopoly and barriers to entry were high." However, in the usual
market structure the effect of merger of a failing firm with a com-
petitor is unclear. When compared to having the failing firm die in
solitude, it is beyond controversy that competition might be ad-
versely affected by a failing company merger. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to hypothesize examples of net adverse effect from a failing
company merger. One attempt to find such examples does not focus
precisely on the question of net adverse effect. 62 Rather, the exam-
ples that are imagined without difficulty illustrate only general
anti-competitive effects that might arise from a failing company
merger. 63
 The effects noted are: swift and cheap movement by the
acquiring firm into a new market; increased production capacity of
the acquiring firm; postponement of market entry by new com-
petitors who might face the increased costs of construction of new
facilities; acquisition of more of the business of the failing firm by
merger while the failing firm was a going concern than would be
available after collapse of the failing company; and, possible in-
crease in horizontal or vertical economic power." These effects are
59 Id.
280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
6 ' G. Malanos, Intermediate Economic Theory 447-84 (1962). This is not a frequent
situation, though it may possibly have been that present in American Press Ass'n v, United
States, 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
Even were the remaining "duopolist" not vulnerable to any antitrust prosecution, it
would face the unusual risk of a classical monopolist—regulation as a public utility. Malanos,
supra, at 452.
62
 Comment, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 566 (1963).
63 Id. at 577-78. The examples of overstated anticompetitive effect have been uncriti-
cally followed. Low, The Failing Company Doctrine Revisited, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 27
(1969). See United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1316-17 (1968); Dean Foods, 70
F.T.C. 1146, 1282-85 (1966).
64 Comment, supra note 62, at 577-78.
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not compared with anticompetitive effects that would ensue if the
failing company merger were disallowed. Therefore, no explicit
judgment can be made of the net benefit which might accrue to
competition by permitting the failing companies to go out of busi-
ness.
Furthermore, one could question the importance of net adverse
effect sounded by the three principal themes of the examples." The
first theme is that the major competitor would be delayed in acquir-
ing the failing company's desirable assets, such as production
facilities, patents, or managerial personnel. It may be fairly sug-
gested that such a delay, measured by the interval between immi-
nent failure and bankruptcy action, is of no substantial benefit to
competition. The second theme is that failing company mergers
would enable the major competitor to take over more of the failing
firm's business than might otherwise be acquired if other com-
petitors had competed for the business. It then would be necessary
to explain why these other competitors were not alternate bidders
for the failing company. If other purchasers did exist, the doctrine
would not have allowed merger with the major competitor." The
third theme is that the merger with a failing firm is part of a
preconceived plan to lessen competition, for instance by forestalling
entry to the market. This net adverse effect can be avoided by
applying the doctrine in its traditional form, which explicitly ex-
cludes the failing company defense in such a case. 67
The most illuminating question to ask concerning examples of
allegedly adverse effects of failing company mergers, is how compe-
tition will be benefited in any substantial manner by disallowing
the merger of a failing company with a major competitor when that
competitor is the only possible merging partner. If the merger is
disallowed in such a situation, the winning, and perhaps, the only
bidder at the forced auction for the failing firm's assets will usually
be the very same major competitor. This is exactly what happened
to Cleveland Metal Products when its merger with Alcoa was
disallowed," and exactly what the courts wanted to prevent in
American Press Association, 69 United States Steel, 7° and Interna-
tional Shoe. 71
Of course one would expect substantial net adverse effects of
failing company mergers to result generally in situations where the
" Id.
66 See text at note 39 supra.
67 International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
68 See note 82 infra.
69
 245 F. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
" 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
7 ' 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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failing company defense is inappropriately recognized by the court,
such as where alternate good faith purchasers might have been
found. Difficult questions associated with proving absence of good
faith purchasers relate to the issue of how the doctrine should be
implemented, not to the issue of whether abuses would be sanc-
tioned if the doctrine were properly implemented. Resolution of
these questions requires the establishment of standards for "good
faith" offers of purchase, assessment of the relative anticompetitive
impact of prospective purchases, and, in order to produce a predict-
able set of rules, the definition of guidelines which encompass these
two criteria and their interrelationship. Assuming that such an
implementation procedure is followed, proper application of the
failing company defense should not have net adverse effects on
competition.
2. Spurring Competition
Legislative concern for the preservation of the failing company
doctrine was expressed during hearings on the Celler-Kefauver
Act. 72
 This concern implies a judgment by Congress that the doc-
trine not only does more good than harm, but also that the good is
done for small business. 73 By assisting small business other antitrust
policies could be furthered. In particular, the probability of offering
competition to bigger businesses would be increased. Contrary to
contentions that bigness is inevitable as well as more efficient, 74
agglomeration may in some cases stifle innovation, and not merely
routinize it. This is not to say that small firms as a class are better in
some sense than the class of large firms. Rather, each class may
have a different role, and in certain industries part of the role of the
class of smaller firms may be offering competition and inducing
innovation beyond that which would be expected of the class of
larger firms acting alone.
Thus, the failing company doctrine might be justified either as
an aid to small business itself, or as an aid to small business as a
means of encouraging competition among big businesses. In either
case, it aids in reducing risk of loss of capital, thereby facilitating
"the flow of capital into such firms;"75 in other words, market entry
is promoted by easing market exit.
72
 Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 899, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1946). Sec note 87 infra.
73 United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1316-17 (1968).
E.g., J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 324 (1967); J. Galbraith, The Affluent
Society 8, 9, 18, 19 (1958).
75 United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1318 n.52 (1968). B. Bock, The Failing
Company Justification for a Merger, The Conference Board Record 26, 31 (1969). Low, The
Failing Company Doctrine Revisited, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 31 (1969).
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The doctrine's role in facilitating market exit has expediting
effects on withdrawal of extremely inefficient firms from the
market. 76 This reason is certainly not controlling if one views
economic efficiency as but one dimension in the antitrust goal
structure." Nevertheless, it would have weight in conjunction with
previously discussed reasons" justifying the use of the doctrine as
an antitrust defense.
C. Subsequent History
1. Stagnation: 1930-1950
After International Shoe and prior to 1950 the failing company
doctrine figured in only four cases and received no judicial de-
velopment clarifying its original formulation. In re Pressed Steel
Car Co. 79 added nothing to International Shoe; United States v.
Republic Steel Corp. 80 noted economic efficiencies accruing from
merger of a company whose business relatives were failing; Beegle
v. Thomson" allowed the failing company doctrine as a defense to a
Sherman Act prosecution; and the Alcoa litigation 82 showed the
i" Bok, Section Seven of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv, L. Rev. 226, 340 (1966); cf. United States v. Republic Steel, Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117
(N.D. Ohio 1935).
" See Bork & Bowman, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 Colum. L.
Rev. 363 (1965). Long-run economic efficiency might be injured by mergers favoring efficiency
in the short-run. Long-run efficiency itself may be weighed against social considerations or
preserving "smallness" or political goals of preventing concentration of economic power
because of non-economic ramifications.
7 ' See text at notes 62-75 supra. In addition, underlying and reinforcing the previously
mentioned purposes of the doctrine, there is a constitutional aspect to the injury described by
the majority in International Shoe. The constitutional argument is that failing company
mergers are usually of very problematical significance. Although preventing such combina-
tions may benefit competition to some degree, this benefit is not substantial enough to
outweigh damage of constitutional proportion—the uncompensated taking of private pro-
prietors' failing companies to further public antitrust policy.
7° 16 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Pa. 1936). This case concerned a company already in bank-
ruptcy rather than one about to fail. Additionally, the merger was upheld because of a lack of
competition between the merging companies. Id. at 338-39. Consequently the holding of this
case did not rely on the failing company doctrine.
8° 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935). In this case, Corrigan, McKinney Steel Co., the
twelfth largest steel company in the United States, and Republic Steel, the third largest, were
permitted to merge because the government failed to prove that competition would be
lessened and that the interests of the public would be injured by a merger. Yet, while
Corrigan's subsidiaries and holding companies might have been failing, it was found as fact
that Corrigan itself was not failing. Id. at 119. Thus, International Shoe could be relied upon
only for its first holding and not for the failing company doctrine.
138 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, .322 U.S. 743 (1944). This case held a
merger not illegal since no competition existed between the merging companies. Noting that
the acquired company was in a "failing condition," the Seventh Circuit added: "Furthermore,
as we pointed out in American Press Ass'n v. U.S.... a firm closing out its business because
of financial difficulties may sell its plant even to a competitor without violating the Antitrust
Law." Id. at 881.
82 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 187-88, 190 (S.D.N.Y.
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futility of prohibiting the use of the failing company doctrine as a
defense. In that case, Cleveland Metal Products was not allowed to
merge with Alcoa, but after failure Alcoa was allowed to pick up all
the marbles at a bankruptcy auction."
2. Legislative Blessing
The failing company doctrine received legislative sanction upon
passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, 84 which strengthened the
Clayton Act. Old defenses to antitrust prosecutions, such as the
purchasing of assets rather than stock" or a judicial finding of
non-competition between merging partners 86—were eliminated.
Legislative history clearly shows an intention to exempt the failing
company doctrine from the elimination of antitrust defenses affected
by the statute.
1. Would the bill prevent a corporation in failing or bank-
rupt condition from selling its assets to a competitor? The
argument that a corporation in bankrupt or failing condi-
tion might not be allowed to sell to a competitor has
already been disposed of by the courts. It is well settled
that the Clayton Act does not apply in bankruptcy or
receivership cases. In the case of International Shoe v.
F.T.C. . . . the Supreme Court went much further. . 87
1941), modified as to other points, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Standard Aluminum Com-
pany was found to be in financial distress, and Bremer-Waltz's St. Louis sheet-rolling mill did
not prosper. Nevertheless, the failing company doctrine was not specifically invoked with
reference to these two companies. However, Alcoa's association with the Cleveland Metal
Products Company was upheld on the basis of the doctrine:
[lin a case arising under the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court has held that the
purchase of a failing business is not unlawful, for the reason that it does not deprive
anyone of the opportunity to compete. [International Shoe Co. v. FTC[. It would
seem equally that in the case at bar, under the Sherman Act, the acquisition of the
Cleveland Company or its property by Alcoa did not constitute a violation, because
it did not lessen competition,
44 F, Supp. at 190.
In a prior phase of litigation, Alcoa had been ordered to divest itself of stock that had
resulted from an association with Cleveland Metal Products, despite a strong dissent that
Cleveland Metal Products was a failing company. Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 F.
401, 410 (3d Cir. 1922). The majority might have felt that Alcoa's price setting tactics had a
significant causal relation to Cleveland Metal Products' eventual withdrawal from competition
with Alcoa. After divestiture Alcoa, as the major creditor, was allowed to foreclose on its debt
and buy up the assets once controlled by Cleveland Metal Products. Aluminum Co. of
America v. FTC, 299 F. 361 (3d Cir. 1924); see United States v, 'Aluminum Co. of America,
44 F. Supp, 97, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
83
 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
84
 Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub, L. No. 899, 64 Stat. 1125, amending 15 U.S.C. fi 18
(1946).
85
 H,R. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
86 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1949).
87
 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary rendered a similar report:
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Economic efficiency and effectiveness against industry giants were
later cited as factors in favor of allowing failing auto manufacturers
to merge. 88
Congress has recently expanded the failing company doctrine
by overruling a recent Supreme Court case 89 in order to permit
mergers to rescue failing newspapers. 9° The legislative history limits
the expansion to newspaper joint operating agreements, with no
intent to alter the failing company doctrine for other markets. How-
ever, a broader definition of failing than that of International
Shoe 91 where the test applied appeared to be "a grave probability of
a business failure" is also endorsed: a "failing newspaper" is defined
in terms of "probable danger of financial failure."92
3. Post-1950 Case Treatment of the Condition "Failing"
Since 1950 the failing company doctrine has been litigated with
frequency. Routine denials93 of the defense have been interspersed
The argument has been made that the proposed bill, if passed, would have the
effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt condition from
selling out.
The Committees are in full accord with the proposition that any firm in such a
condition should be free to dispose of its stock or assets. The Committees, however,
do not believe that the proposed bill will prevent sales of this type.
The judicial interpretation on this point goes back many years and is abun-
dantly clear. According to decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does not
apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover; the Court has held, with
respect to this specific section 1* 71, that a company does not have to be actually in a
state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient that it is heading
in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy will ensue. On this specific
point the Supreme Court, in the case of [International Shoe] said: "It is expected
that, in the administration of the act, full consideration will be given to all matters,
bearing upon the maintenance of competition, including the circumstances giving
rise to the acquisition."
5. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950), quoting International Shoe, 280 U.S. at 301.
Judicial and law review commentary, indicating that legislative history to the 1950
amendment of § 7 of the Clayton Act "casts doubt" on International Shoe, refers to the first
holding of that case and not to the failing company doctrine. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1953) affirming 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953);
Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 766, 772-73
(1952); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1951).
99 S. Rep. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1957). This Senate Report, a staff study
by the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, also
discussed the failing company doctrine with emphasis on the making of a "good faith effort"
to sell the acquired company to someone other than the acquiring competitor in order to
comply with the "no other buyer available" condition of International Shoe. Id. at 42.
99 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
99 Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1801-04 (1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3547.
91 See notes 39, 87 supra and note 153 infra.
92 15 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (1970).
93 See Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 393 U.S. 79 (1968); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964); Crown Zellerback Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, .370 U.S.
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with outright approvals," oblique approvals," and a summary
judgment squabble. 96 Factual variations among the denials, ranging
937 (1962), In Crown Zellerback, the court declared: "The circumstances would permit a
finding that the directors wanted to quit; but the record does not compel a finding that St.
Helens was in a failing or near bankrupt condition. Quite the contrary." 296 F.2d at 831. The
court then examined the findings of the FTC (showing substantial net worth, and consistent
earnings and dividends by St. Helens) and found them to be supported in the record:
There are no facts in this record to clearly indicate that St. Helens would have been
unable to complete its modernization program. We are of the opinion that St. Helens
had been and was at the time of the acquisition an effective competitor, and that
there is no sufficient reason to believe that it was in a failing or bankrupt condition.
Id. at 832.
94 See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1958), modifying 167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958). See also United States v. Maryland
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1959), affirmed, 362 U.S. 458 (1960);
see cases cited in note 102 infra and Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. 21,135, 21,203 (F.T.C. 1969). In Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n the
court stated:
The evidence establishes without contradiction that at the time when the capital
stock of these two corporations [Richfield and Simpson Brothers, operators of the
Wakefield Dairy] was purchased by the defendant the two companies were
hopelessly insolvent and were deeply in debt. The defendant was a very large
creditor, for an amount exceeding $300,000, for unpaid milk bills. The Wakefield
Dairy was in fact on the brink of bankruptcy.
The acquisitions of capital stock or assets of a failing corporation is not within
the ban of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. While the statute does not expressly so
provide, this conclusion is inherent in the statutory provision because the acquisition
of a failing corporation that is on the verge of going out of business cannot result in
lessening competition or in creating a monopoly. He that as it may, the Supreme
Court so held in [International Shoe].
167 F. Stipp, at 803.
95
 See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where United
Airlines was allowed to merge with Capital Airlines in order to restore "a new and hearty
competitor [to a market where an erstwhile hearty competitor in a vast area was about to
collapse and pass from the picture. The market then] had more competition and thus less
monopoly" than before. Id. at 401. The antitrust law at issue was § 408(b) (the first proviso) of
the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970). Unlike the CAB, the court declined to rest
its holdings on the failing company doctrine:
Counsel argue this point in terms of the "failing business doctrine" and the Interna-
tional Shoe case. We think we need not try to fit this problem as we have it, into
ready-made doctrinaire styles or sizes; the matter is clear enough on the face of the
facts and the statute [the Federal Aviation Act of 1958] without intermediate mea-
surements.
Id. at 402. See also cases at notes 102, 112 infra. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of
New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 587 (1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Gimbel Bros. Inc.,
202 F. Supp. 779, 780 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United States v. Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc., 1961
Trade Cas. 78,621, 78,639.40 (N.D. Tex. 1961); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 74 F.T.C. 251
(1968).
66 See United States v, Diebold, Inc,, 369 U.S. 654 (1962). In Diebold, the Supreme
Court reversed a summary judgment which had upheld Diebold's acquisition of the assets of
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company (HHM) against a challenge brought under § 7 of the
Clayton Act:
In determining that the acquisition of the assets of [HHM] was not a violation of § 7,
the District Court acted upon its findings that "HEIM was hopelessly insolvent and
faced with imminent receivership" and that "Diebold was the only bona fide pros-
pective purchaser for HHM's business." The latter finding represents at least in part
the resolution of a head-on factual controversy as revealed by the materials before
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from a voluntary liquidation97
 and voluntary depletion of a rare
resource98
 to failing personal health, 99 suggest that managerial
discretion—in terminating an endeavor, in pursuing a project of
limited probability, or in retaining ill executives—cannot be deter-
minative of whether a firm is "failing."
However, certain of the oblique approvals suggest that the
doctrine is developing singular characteristics in four lines of enter-
prise. Either because of the nature of the enterprise or because of
institutionalized regulation in the name of the public, three of the
lines are associated with a concept of the "public interest" more
concretely defined than is usual for industrial and commercial ac-
tivities. Failing banks are eligible for expansive interpretation of the
doctrine.'°° Likewise, more fully regulated industries may be eligi-
the District Court of whether other offers for HHM's assets or business were actually
made. In any event both findings represent a choice of inference to be drawn from
the subsidiary facts contained in the affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions
submitted below. On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. A study of the record in this light leads
us to believe that inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court might be
permissible. The materials before the District Court having thus raised a genuine
issue as to ultimate facts material to the rule of International Shoe Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, it was improper for the District Court to decide the applicability of
the rule on a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 655. Diebold's significance was clarified in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963), where the court, citing Diebold, stated:
There is an analogy from the merger field that leads us to conclude that a trial
should be had, A merger that would otherwise offend the antitrust laws because of a
substantial lessening of competition had been given immunity where the acquired
company was a failing one. See [International Shoe]. But in such a case, as in cases
involving the questions whether a particular merger will tend "substantially to lessen
competition" a trial rather than the use of the summary judgment is normally
necessary.
Id. at 263-64.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258 (C.D. Cal.
1973). In Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961), Erie Sand & Gravel
became the dominant lake sand producer on Lake Erie by buying its competitor, the
Sandusky Division of the Kelly Island Co., after the directors of Kelly Island had voted to
liquidate their corporation: "This fact . . . is said to show that Eric would have been relieved
of the Sandusky competition whether or not it purchased the Sandusky business." Ed. at 280.
The Court held against Erie. First, there were several alternative purchasers who made
"substantial offers." Secondly, decision by owners to liquidate "is not enough to create a
'failing company' situation." Id.
93 Sec United States v. Pennzoil, 252 F. Supp. 962, 978-79 (W.D. Pa. 1965), where
potential depleting of a rare resource, reserves of Penn Grade crude, was held not to
constitute presently healthy Kendall Refining Co. "failing."
99 See Ekco Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1221 (1964), where the failing health of an
owner/manager did not cause the business to be characterized as failing.
'ft In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court in
dictum proposed that the failing company doctrine "might have somewhat larger contours as
applied to bank mergers because of the greater public impact of a bank failure compared with
ordinary business failures." Id. at 372 n.46. See Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of
Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 213, 226 (1972).
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ble in proceedings before their regulatory agencies, as illustrated in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB."" Newspapers initially received
favorable judicial treatment, 102
 which was later reversed, 103
 and the
reversal was then legislatively overruled. The consequence was that
the newspaper industry is now entitled to the most expansive protec-
tion ever accorded by the doctrine.'"
Finally, multi-industry enterprises may be treated specially.
Proposed mergers of their failing subsidiaries,'° 5 divisions,' 06
products,'" or even parents' °8
 must be scrutinized more carefully
The criterion under the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. 1828 (c)(5)(B) (1970), of "the
convenience and needs of the community to be served is related, though perhaps remotely, [to]
... the failing-company doctrine .. . ." United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361,
369 (1967). Cf. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 183 (1968).
Despite Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the larger contours of the failing
company doctrine concerning banks were upheld on summary judgment. Granader v. Public
Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 81, 83-84 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970). For a
discussion of Citizen Publishing sec text at note 89 supra. There a bank "on the brink of
bankruptcy with no possibility of recovery," Granader v. Public Bank, 281 F. Supp. 120, 175
(E.D. Mich. 1967), was purchased by "the only realistic" purchaser. 417 F,2(1 at 83.
" I 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See note 95 supra.
103
	 Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir.
1960). See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136 n.2 (1969).
Ina
	 Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
104 See text at notes 88-91 supra.
1 " See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal.
1972) (subsidiary was not proven to be failing and alternative good faith purchasers were
deliberately not sought after the best available purchaser became interested); United States v.
Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 584 n.1 (W,13. Okla. 1967) (sale of a failing subsidiary
was supported by way of dictum).
1 " See Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956). The failing company defense by Farm
Journal was rejected with regard to its purchase of its only major competitor, Country
Gentlemen, a division of Curtis Publishing Company, since Curtis could have continued with
Country Gentlemen or could have sold it to another farm publication. If it would not have
done either, Farm Journal had only to wait for Country Gentlemen's demise, saving it the
assumption of millions of dollars of obligations: "The record does not show that Curtis had to
sell, or that it had no other . . feasible alternative. Rather it shows an uncompelled decision
to sell at what certainly cannot be regarded as a distress consideration." Id. at 26, 30, 48. Cf.
Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1272-76 (1966), where non-failing Bowman Dairy Co. was
found financially capable of rehabilitating its possibly failing Chicago market dairy operations
and its consistently money-losing Cleveland ice cream plant.
1 " United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). This
case involved a failing product, Monsanto's "All." A "product" is not a sub-category of a
business corporation significantly different from a "division." Yet Monsanto's transfer of "All"
to Lever Bros. was upheld largely because Monsanto was no longer competing effectively,
while Lever Bros. could compete "by virtue of [its] experience, expertise and substantial
financial position . . ." Id. at 898. Monsanto's forte did not involve "developing and
marketing consumer products," and it probably did not have access to the advertising
economies of its giant conglomerate competitors, since it spent only $17,000,000 in 1955 (of
which $12,000,000 was for "All" and $5,000,000 was for about 500 other products). The court
felt that antitrust purposes were better served by having three healthy competitors in the low
sudsing detergent market—Procter and Gamble, Colgate, and Lever Brothers—than by two
strong giants and an about-to-exit Monsanto, with Lever Brothers hardly in the wings. Lever
Brothers had previously tried to break into the 'market but failed to produce a salable product
and had lost over $36,000,000. Id. at 896.
The distinction between Farm Journal and Lever Brothers is that parent Curtis was held
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than an entire failing company because of management's broad
powers to shape intra-entity accounts. 109 On the other hand acquisi-
tion of failing companies (or parts thereof) by multi-industry enter-
prises, not theretofore competitors, may be more widely sheltered
by the doctrine than competitors' acquisitions. " 0 . For example, in
United States v. Lever Brothers Company,'" one of the reasons
why Lever Brothers was allowed to acquire "All" from Monsanto
was that Lever Brothers was not a present competitor in "All's"
low-sudsing detergent market. Inasmuch as the antitrust conse-
quences of conglomerate mergers still present an unresolved issue of
antitrust policy, it may be that such mergers would be favored in
the future as opposed to mergers of competitors, which involve more
clearly perceived antitrust aspects. 112 Where antitrust abuses of
such a merger are clearly perceived, for instance when an economic
giant seeks to acquire a failing company in an industry of small
competitors, there would be no reason to favor conglomerate mer-
gers.
4. Contemporary Issues
Recent legal evolution has focused upon the absoluteness of the
failing company defense, redefinition of failure, and the burden of ,
proving absence of alternate good faith purchasers.
a. Absolute or Relative Defense—Throughout most of the his-
tory of the failing company doctrine, the absoluteness of the defense
was assumed. Once a company was found to be failing and no
alternate good faith purchasers existed, an otherwise illegal merger
would be allowed. In the original International Shoe litigation, the
FTC and the First Circuit conducted a public interest inquiry and
concluded that McElwain should go into reorganization proceed-
ings; the Supreme Court changed the legal rule, struck its own
capable of restoring Country Gentlemen to an active competitive role, whereas parent Mon-
santo was not able to do the same for "All." Further, "All" was sold to a company that was
judged neither a present competitor in the relevant market nor a likely potential competitor.
109 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 478 n.2, 495 (E.D. Wis.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1966). Pabst, in serious straits, acquired
Blatz in large part to obtain the services of Blatz' management. On remand, the district court
reversed its original findings and concluded that although the failing company doctrine applies
to failing parents, Pabst had not proven Blatz was failing or that Pabst was the only available
good faith purchaser. 296 F. Supp. 994, 1001-03 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
109 See Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968), quoted in part at note
146 infra.
"° See United States v. Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. 78,621 (N.D.
Tex. 1961).
"' United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See discussion
in note 107 supra.
112 The importance of maintaining competition in the failing company's industry may
outweigh possible antitrust abuses of conglomerate mergers, just as this criterion has justified
merger of failing competitors. See notes 90, 95 supra and text following note 168 infra.
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public interest balance, and concluded that reorganization should
not be countenanced)" For the next generation the failing company
doctrine was assumed to be an absolute defense.
Recent merger activity has, however, occasioned thoughts of
public interest balances: "[I]n cases where the likelihood of business
failure is more questionable, the failing firm defense should not be
sustained without considering the magnitude of the merger and the
market context in which it takes place. )1114
This view is consonant with the FTC's dictum in Pillsbury
Mills, Inc. 115 to the effect that the condition "failing" presents one
ingredient for a public interest balance. 116
 This approach was sub-
sequently clarified in United States Steel Corp. 117
 in which U.S.
Steel, the nation's fourth largest producer of portland cement, ac-
quired Certified Industries, Inc., one of the four largest producers of
ready-mixed concrete in the New York City market, after extending
financial support to Certified in return for assuring future cement
sales to Certified. After finding that Certified was failing,'" that
U.S. Steel was the only good faith purchaser, 19 that no other
good faith purchaser would have had "lesser anticompetitive
effect," 12 ° and that U.S. Steel's loan was neither a tie-in nor part of
a step transaction conspiracy,' 21
 the FTC nonetheless ordered
113 280 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1930).
114 Bok, Section Seven of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev, 226, 343 (1960).
115 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pillsbury Co. v, FTC,
354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
16 In Pillsbury Mills, the FTC found no grave probability of a business failure but at
most a profitable enterprise under some financial pressure. 57 F.T.C. at 1409. Moreover,
there was an alternative purchaser for Ballard and Ballard Company, the company acquired
by Pillsbury.
The FTC refused to follow Pillsbury's interpretation of International Shoe—that trends
should be viewed as determinative of "failing." The FTC declined to agree that Ballard's
three-year declining trend in ratio of net worth to total debt, net earnings, and profit per sales
dollar would continue. Pillsbury had argued that if the trends continued and if additional
working capital could not be acquired, Ballard would fail in the near future. Id.
The FTC went further and added that International Shoe did not present an absolute
defense to a prosecution under § 7 of the Clayton Act. International Shoe "merely [establishes]
the imminent insolvency as one of the relevant factors in assessing the competitive effect
. . ." Id.
1 " 74 F.T,C. 1270 (1968).
See National Portland Cement Co., 71 F.T.C. 395, 471-74 (1967), in which the FTC
made its findings of fact regarding the Certified-U.S. Steel merger.
119
 Id. at 475.
120 Id. at 478-82.
121 Id. at 476-77,
A "tie-in" is a seller's requirement that a buyer purchase one product (the "tied" product)
in order for the buyer to be able to purchase one or more of the seller's other products ("tieing"
product or products). M. Handler, Trade Regulation 307 (3d ed. 1960).
The "step transaction" approach requires a series of steps to be viewed as all part of one
transaction, regardless of their formal nature. The effect of a step transaction approach is to
compare the substance of a situation before a series of steps with that at the end of the series.
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divestiture, 122 holding the failing company doctrine not to be an
absolute defense:
Mil any case involving the acquisition of a failing company
we must determine whether the acquisition may result in a
substantial lessening of competition and, if so, the acquisi-
tion must be declared illegal in the absence of probable
harm to innocent individuals so serious and substantial
that the public interest requires that the acquisition
nevertheless be permitted. . . The fact that a firm was
"failing" at the time of acquisition does not necessarily
create a presumption, conclusive or otherwise, that its
purchase was without potential or actual detrimental com-
petitive effect within one or more markets. 123
The Commission omitted an explicit balancing of interests. Yet
it concluded that "nothing in the record" suggested that the an-
ticompetitive effects of the transaction are outweighed by other
considerations, such as harm to creditors, stockholders, employees,
or communities. 124
The dissent of Commissioner Elman questioned whether "the
Commission should engage in a complex and elaborate 'public in-
terest' inquiry ... into the degree of 'serious and substantial' injury
to 'innocent' employees, stockholders, and the communities in which
a failing firm does business.""s Further, a challenge was made to
the majority's premise that the justification for the failing company
doctrine is solely that merger of a failing firm cannot result in injury
to competition. 126
 Indeed the possibility of important anticompeti-
tive effects was acknowledged. 127 According to Commissioner
Elman, other considerations underlying the failing company de-
fense are: (1) minimizing the losses to employees, owners, creditors,
and communities associated with the failing company that the court
set forth in International Shoe; (2) removing one of the risks facing
small or new businesses and thus not impeding their quest for
The step transaction approach is most popularly known in the income tax context, particu-
larly that of corporate reorganizations. See Walter S. Heller, 2 T.C. 371, 383 (1943). How-
ever, the theme of this approach—substance over form—applies particularly well to other
areas of government regulation of business.
In "Divestiture" is the removal of one or more of an entity's business activities from its
control in order to avoid violation of antitrust law. It is a remedy applied, judicially or
administratively, to prevent an antitrust violator from enjoying the results of its violations, as
well as ending the violations. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253
(1959).
123 74 F.T.C. at 1288. Cf. Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
124 74 F.T.C. at 1304.
125 Id. at 1310 (dissenting opinion).
ilb Id. at 1309-14 (dissenting opinion).
127 Id. at 1316 (dissenting opinion).
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capital; (3) providing a ready means for "withdrawal from the
market of seriously inefficient firms;" and (4)
due process, the fundamental principle that private prop-
erty may be taken for a public use only if just and equita-
ble compensation is paid, may'underlie the Court's concern
in International Shoe, shared by Congress, that small
businessmen and investors not be forced to sacrifice their
assets, lose their equity, and suffer bankruptcy, in the
interest of antitrust policy. ] 28.
Commissioner Elman concluded that treating failing as one
element in a public interest balancing would dilute and perhaps
eliminate the defense whenever the acquiring firm is large.' 29
Furthermore, he did not think the FTC is competent to "deal with
the complex problem of determining in each case what weight to
assign to the injuries against the anticompetitive effects foreseen
from the merger." 13 °
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deftly
remanded for further findings of fact:
[The] very theoretical conflict which we have here
—whether "failing company" status is to immunize an
acquisition or is merely to be a factor to be weighed in
determining whether the acquisition is in the "public in-
terest" . . . need not [be resolved here] because . . . U.S.
Steel has failed' to prove the "ultimate facts material to the
rule of International Shoe. . . 13 '
Noting the affirmation and narrowing of the doctrine by the
Supreme Court, 132
 the Sixth Circuit pursued the Citizen Publishing
dictum which redefined failure as the inability to emerge from
reorganization as a competitive unit.' 33 The court rested its holding
partly on implications from "the ultimate facts" of International
Shoe—that McElwain's possibility of being reorganized had been
dismissed after thorough consideration "as lying wholly within the
realm of speculation: 134
U.S. Steel and the [FTC] have devoted insufficient consid-
eration to the prospects of reorganizing Certified into a
129 Id. at 1317-18 (dissenting opinion).
129 Id. at 1319 (dissenting opinion).
13° Id. (dissenting opinion).
131 United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 1970).
132
 Id. at 607-09.
132
 Id. at 609.
134 Id. at 608.
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vital, competitive company. The record, however, is re-
plete with evidence . . [to] suggest the possibility that"
Certified may have been split into several going concern
packages in a receivership proceeding. 135
The case was also remanded to determine the extent "that Certified's
cement demands occurred as a result of the [pre-merger] financial
arrangement." 136
Essentially, the second leg of the Sixth Circuit's holding is that
U.S. Steel's original loans and subsequent acquisition were anti-
competitively motivated, while the first leg is compatible with a
gloss on the good faith purchaser rationale—that a combination of
good faith purchasers must be considered, and not simply a single
purchaser, in either of two cases: (1) when the single purchaser is an
economic giant relative to the failing company's competitors; or (2)
when the merger appears to be obviously destabilizing for a given
market. Thus, the court's opinion advances the traditional concept
of the failing company doctrine and avoids falling into the quagmire
of a public interest inquiry.
The latest lower court development' 37
 concerning an admit-
tedly failing company, indicates that failure is already being
redefined and also demonstrates the impracticality of case-by-case,
public interest balances. There the public interest inquiry was not
followed with either a balancing or even an unsupported conclusion;
instead, the failing company merger was simply disallowed: "If
Associated fails, we are not certain whether the effect on competi-
tion would be more detrimental than if Associated leaves the com-
petitive field by merger. . . . The possible effect on competition if
Associated's brands are lost to the marketplace has not been
explored."' 38
The real issue then, is whether the courts will apply a single
public interest balancing to all failing company doctrine cases or
individual public interest balances to each case. There is also a
middle path, implicit in the finding of wider contours for the failing
company doctrine in certain lines of enterprise,' 39 of striking a
public interest balance for each major market—such as public
utilities, banks, newspapers, brewing or steel by geographic region.
Pursuit of such a middle route would involve setting certain public
135 Id. at 609.
136
 Id. at 610.
137
 United States v. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
139
 Id. at 123.
139
 See notes 100-12 supra. Legislative support for different standards in different mar-
kets is also implicit in the exception for the newspaper industry, discussed in text at notes
90-92 supra.
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interest standards in each market area; it would not require public
interest balancing for every failing company case arising within each
market. Such major market public interest balancing would also
result in different levels of probability constituting that level which
is sufficiently "grave" to justify failing company mergers in different
industries. 14 " Thus, for instance, the doctrine's wider ambit for
banks' 4 ' would operationally mean that the public interest in pre-
venting bank failures is greater than that which exists for an ordi-
nary commercial failure. Hence, a failing bank would qualify for the
failing company defense with a lower probability of failure than
would an ordinary business.
The advantage of a public interest inquiry is completeness; its
disadvantages in this context are its difficulty of accomplishment
and its failure to provide failing companies with a predictable rule
to guide selection of possible merging partners.' 42 In Heileman
Brewing, for example, an ambitious public interest inquiry was only
attempted, with no report of a balancing of public interests, and the
court even neglected to buttress its holding by stating the conclusion
to its public interest inquiry. 143
In regard to the future development of the failing company
doctrine, the absolute defense versus the public interest inquiry
issue, as well as the redefinition of failure question, might profitably
be viewed in the context of strengthening the good faith purchaser
concept, with the recognition that even the absolute defense ap-
proach entails an elemental ,public-interest balance.
b. Redefinition of Failure—If a company can be failing, "fail-
ure" must have an operational meaning. Unfortunately the concept
of "failure" has not been concretely developed since the failing
company defense received its initial judicial recognition in Interna-
tional Shoe. 144 Usually reference is made to "bankruptcy," but no
differentiation is made as to type of bankruptcy-receiverships under
aegis of preferred stockholders or creditors, formal reorganization,
or a Chapter X 145 proceeding likely to end in dismantlement. Cases
14° See notes 100-12 supra and text at notes 90-92 supra.
141 See note 100 supra.
145 United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1316-18 (1968). See Bok, Section Seven of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 346 (1960);
Low, The Failing Company Doctrine Revisited, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 31 (1969).
143 United States v. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp, 117, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1972),
'" But see Note, 68 Yale L.J. 1627, 1664 n.195 (1959). Definitions of failure less
stringent than that of International Shoe also have meaning in a business context. For
example, inability to earn a competitive rate of return on investment may be personally
baneful for management and owners, and eventually employees and communities, but is not
itself sufficient to constitute failure in the failing company doctrine context. Omission of a
preferred dividend is usually something of a financial disaster but since McElwain had done
just that on second preferred, this criterion falls short of "failure."
145 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
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subsequent to International Shoe do not develop the concept of
"failing;" they usually do no more than repeat the original formula-
tion. Even the Antitrust Division ventures little more in its
guidelines. 146
The latest development concerning the condition "failing" is a
hint of a redefinition of failure. The Supreme Court in International
Shoe had been chary of predicting the outcome of bankruptcy
proceedings. 147
 Moreover, the Court may have inferred that preser-
vation of going concern value usually depends on merger before
bankruptcy proceedings are announced. However, dictum of the
majority opinion in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States' 48
 has
disclosed a willingness, identical to that of the FTC,' 49 First
Circuit, 15° and the dissent in International Shoe, 151 to consider the
outcome of bankruptcy proceedings:
Moreover, we know from the broad experience of the
business community since 1930, the year when the Interna-
146
 A merger which the Department would otherwise challenge will ordinarily not
be challenged if (i) the resources of one of the merging firms are so depleted and its
prospects for rehabilitation so remote that the firm faces the clear probability of a
business failure, and (ii) good faith efforts by the failing firm have failed to elicit a
reasonable offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes of Section 7 by a
firm which intends to keep the failing firm in the market. The Department regards
as failing only those firms with no reasonable prospect of remaining viable; it does
not regard a firm as failing merely because the firm has been unprofitable fora
period of time, has lost market position in some other respect, has poor manage-
ment, or has not fully explored the possibility of overcoming its difficulties through
"self-help."
Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines 11, 12, 19 (May 30, 1968). To failing subsidiaries or
divisions a stricter test is applied:
In determining the applicability of the above standard to the acquisition of a failing
division of a multi-market company, such factors as the difficulty in assessing the
viability of a portion of a company, the possibility of arbitrary, accounting practices,
and the likelihood that an otherwise healthy company can rehabilitate one of its
parts, will lead the Department to apply this standard only in the clearest of
circumstances.
Id. at 12. For conglomerate mergers marginally offensive to the guidelines and involving a
failing company, "the Department may deem it inappropriate to sue under Section 7 even
though the acquired firm is not 'failing' in the strict sense." Id. at 26-27.
149
 International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
148 394 U.S. 131 (1969). Citizen Publishing presents a newspaper joint operating agree-
ment whereby the only two newspapers in Tucson merged all their business operations except
their news and editorial departments. The Citizen, which was failing, executed the agreement
with the Star in 1940, for 25 years. In 1953 the agreement was extended to 1990.
The majority, per Mr. Justice Douglas, held that although the Citizen was failing in
1940, its owners had made no effort to find alternate purchasers. Id.. at 138. Mr. Justice
Harlan concurred in the majority's result but proposed that the critical event for determining
applicability of the failing company doctrine was the 1953 extension of the agreement. From
1940 to 1953 the joint venture had been consistently profitable, and the failing company
doctrine would not have justified extension. Id. at 142.
149 International Shoe Co., 9 F.T.C. 441 (1914).
13° International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1928).
181 280 U.S. at 303 (dissenting opinion).
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tional Shoe case was decided, that companies reorganized
through receivership, or through Chapter X or Chapter XI
of the Bankruptcy Act often emerged as strong competitive
companies. The prospects of reorganization of the Citizen
in 1940 would have had to be dim or nonexistent to make
the failing company doctrine applicable to this case. 152
Citizen Publishing in effect requires two separate judgments of
probability. The first is the probability that a business will go into
receivership or reorganization proceedings, and the second, given
reorganization, is the probability that a business will not emerge as
a competitive factor. The ultimate facts of International Shoe do
not support the Citizen Publishing position. 153 International Shoe
focused on recovery of business "to a normal condition,"" 4 not on
recovery of a reorganized business as some type of competitive
factor. The clear divergence between the approaches of the First'
Circuit 155 and the FTC 156 in considering the probability of reor-
ganization, and the Supreme Court's refusal to do so, marked the
birth of the failing company doctrine. The Supreme Court created
the doctrine by refusing to consider the probability of reorganization
because of its conclusion that an attempt to assess the probability of
reorganization would be wholly within the realm of speculation." 157
Some sort of conclusion is needed here. Should Citizen Publishing
be followed in the future, despite the lack of support from Interna-
tional Shoe?
Before examining further judicial development of the
redefinition of failure implicit in the Citizen Publishing dictum, the
consequences of changing that definition should be considered in the
context of strengthening the good faith purchaser requirement, also
emphasized in Citizen Publishing. A more stringent definition of
failure—and the highly qualitative burden of proof entailed in estab-
lishing that a bankrupt company will not be reorganized as a com-
petitive force—will inevitably increase the hardship and losses at-
tendant upon business failures. On the other hand, a stronger good
faith purchaser requirement might minimize harm to failing
businesses as well as prevent antitrust abuses.
c. Good Faith Purchasers—Since the heart of objections to
the doctrine must go to the identity of the failing company's merging
152 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added).
153 But see United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 609 (6th Cir. 1970),
154
 280 U.S. at 301.
155
 International Shoe Co, v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518, 521 (1st Cir. 1928).
156
 International Shoe Co., 9 F.T.C. 441 (1914).
07
 280 U.S. at 301-02, 306. Contra, United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.Zd 592, 608
(6th Cir. 1970), indicating the Supreme Coures'view that the forecasting of business failure was
more appropriately within the ken of the merging parties than that of the FTC and the court.
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partner, and since this identity is the key to the most obvious
adverse competitive effects of failing company mergers, attention
should be given to the manner in which the existence of one and
only one good faith purchaser is ascertained. International Shoe
specifies that there must be "no other prospective purchaser" for an
otherwise illegal merger to be allowed. 158 This formulation has
never been supplemented by any guidance as to how the absence of
other purchasers is to be determined.
The search for alternate good faith purchasers in International
Shoe was listless; McElwain's management thought that Interna-
tional Shoe would be the only interested party financially capable of
making the purchase.'" The sole effort to contact anyone else was
an approach to Endicott Johnson which was not followed up be-
cause Mr. Wendell Endicott was away hunting in the Canadian
woods1 16 °
Citizen Publishing put new emphasis on merging partners' car-
rying their burden of proof that no alternate good faith purchasers
existed. 16 ' The Supreme Court reiterated this position in United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 162 where only the two most likely
purchasers were considered and other possibilities were not ex-
plored.
It would seem that a detailed showing of efforts to find alter-
nate good faith purchasers should be required. The report of a
merger-broker or investment banker acting in that capacity might
provide objective evidence to supplement the opinions of the failing
firm's management. It has also been suggested that public bidding
should be required for failing companies.'" Advantages of a more
exhaustive requirement are that the chances of finding alternate
purchasers will be increased, as will the confidence that any pur-
chaser alleged to be the only one available is in fact the only one
available. Other purchasers need not have offers as lucrative as that
of the largest competitor; the difference between good faith offers
would be a measure of the value of monopoly power. The antitrust
regulator could then grant letters of clearance or litigate on the basis
of which purchaser should be chosen to minimize anticompetitive
impact. For instance, merger with a relatively small competitor,
1" 280 U.S. at 302.
159
	 at 295, International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
160 Id. at 356.
161
 394 U.S. at 138.
162 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971). Judicial development, springing from Citizen Publishing
and Greater Buffalo Press, is already beginning to proceed along these lines. See United States
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259-60 (C.D. Cal. 1973), where the court
emphasized the lack of exploration for alternate good faith mergers with a less adverse
competitive impact.
1" Note, 68 Yale L.J. 1627, 1666-68 (1959).
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with a potential entrant, or with a large conglomerate would usually
have less adverse expected results than merger with the industry
leader. The antitrust decision of how to minimize anticompetitive
effect would involve determining the parameters of market struc-
ture, which are more explicit and quantifiable than the elements of a
public interest inquiry.
To assure thoroughness of search, guidelines could be published
by antitrust agencies detailing the type of search and objective
verification that would be persuasive for granting letters of clear-
ance. If litigation ensued, the report of the search would provide
information more specific than that which is usually available. Ab-
sence of a report would be persuasive evidence that the search was
not thorough; the opportunity of rebuttal would be allowed for the
rare case of such swift developments that compliance with the
guidelines was not possible.
The only alleged drawback of a strengthened good faith pur-
chaser requirement is implicit in the FTC's holding in United States
Steel. 164 There the FTC concluded that United States Steel was the
only possible good faith purchaser for Certified, 165 and further, that
any purchaser would have had no "lesser anticompetitive effect,"' 66
a seemingly incredible finding in view of the predominant economic
position of United States Steel as compared with that of Certified's
competitors in the cement market.
Another allegedly anticompetitive failing company purchase,
albeit less obviously so than the Certified-U. S. Steel merger, was
Heileman Brewing Company's plan to purchase the midwestern
brewing plants of Associated Brewing Company and thereby in-
crease its midwestern market share from 7.4% to 12.9%. 167 In
Heileman, as previously noted,' 68 the "anticompetitive" finding was
wholly unsupported in the court's opinion.
There is one obvious route to rectifying market distortions
alleged in both U.S. Steel and Heileman Brewing. This route would
not require either a complex public interest inquiry or redefinition of
failure (with its attendant assessment of dual probabilities—the
probability of business failure and the conditional probability, given
failure, of successful reorganization as a competitive factor). The
alternate route is to strengthen the good faith purchaser concept by
a requirement that, whenever a single good faith purchaser would
otherwise acquire unreasonable market power, a group of good faith
L64 United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1304 (1968).
165 See note 119 supra.
166 See note 120 supra.
"'T See United States v. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (RD, Mich. 1972).
166 See text at note 143 supra.
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purchasers must be considered. This solution would have been
particularly appropriate for the cases of Certified Cement and 'As-
sociated Breweries because each of these failing companies was
failing partially as a result of rapid, undigested horizontal acquisi-
tions, which could have been spun off to a combination of several
good faith purchasers.' 69
D. Conclusions
1. Allowable Defense
The rationale and history of the failing company doctrine
should qualify it as an allowable defense in any antitrust context.
The doctrine was born in a Clayton section 7 case and it was
reinforced by the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver amend-
ment to the Clayton Act in 1950. However, its roots clearly lie in
Sherman Act cases and its vitality as a Sherman Act defense has
been affirmed by the Supreme Court.'" In addition the doctrine is
more liberally applied to bank mergers."' The Federal Communi-
cations Commission allows the defense."' Further, the Civil
Aeronautics Board has allowed the defense in a suit brought under
the Federal Aviation Act, though the affirming District of Columbia
Circuit shied away from the nomenclature. 173 Insofar as the still
viable Shawnee Compress 174 case might be considered a parallel, if
forgotten, development, one might argue for the availability of the
defense in any antitrust action.
2. Absoluteness of the Defense
Whether the failing company doctrine should be an absolute
defense is a question that requires a preliminary resolution of the
issue of applying a public interest balance. There are three possible
balancing methods under which: (1) a single public interest balance
would apply to all cases; (2) every case would give rise to its own
individual public interest balance; or (3) public interest balances
would be set for major markets. This matter is discussed further at
the end of the last section of this article.
1 " See United States Steel, 426 F.2d at 607; Heileman Brewing, 345 F. Supp. at 123.
See also Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 21,135
(F.T.C. 1969), indicating that the FTC has thought about "piecemeal" good faith purchases.
A variant of the "piecemeal" approach already exists in the allowance of sales of failing
subsidiaries, divisions, and products. International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. at 301-02.
1 " Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
111 Sec note 100 supra.
"2
 See Channel 2 Corp., 3 F.C.C. 2d 69, 71 (1966). There, a multiple TV station owner
was allowed to buy a failing independent TV station, after all efforts to sell the independent to
non-multiple owners failed. Cf. Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C. 2d 870, 923
(1971); ABC-ITT Merger, 9 F.C.C. 2d 546, 568 (1967).
123
 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
174 209 U.S. 423 (1908). The Shawnee case is discussed in the text at notes 53-56 supra.
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3. Definitions of Failing and Failure
Failing is a high, but unspecified, probability of failure. The
definition of failure has never been explicitly stated in a judicial
opinion. It clearly includes bankruptcy and excludes omission of
preferred dividends. However, Citizen Publishing hints that dis-
mantlement may be included in a future redefinition of failure.'"
4. Purposes
The doctrine serves the purposes of; moderating the operation
of the law by incorporating the objective of mercy as a factor in
applying the antitrust laws and thereby allowing mergers with some
anticompetitive effect, while preventing losses attendant on liquida-
tions; and spurring competition by aiding market entry of new
businesses and smoothing market exit of failing firms. Moreover, in
the entire history of the failing company doctrine, the possible
anticompetitive effects of allowing failing company mergers have
been misconstrued. The only clear advantages to competition in
forcing failing companies to liquidate instead of allowing merger
with a competitor are measured by two criteria—the decrease in
failed company asset value caused by liquidation, and the delay
incurred by the competitor in acquiring such assets.
5. Alternative Good Faith Purchaser
The most exciting possibility is that an interrelationship could
be developed between the requirements of "failing" and "good faith
purchaser." If an allegedly failing company is not failing, alternate
purchasers are likely to exist, and the "failing" issue need be consid-
ered only after proof of absence of alternative good faith purchasers.
Implicit in the concept "good faith" is the purchaser's intention to
operate the failing company and not merely to harvest tax losses.
Nevertheless, the precise nature of the burden of proof concern-
ing the existence of alternate bidders has not yet been defined. 176 If
antitrust agencies develop guidelines concerning fulfillment of the
"no alternate good faith purchaser" requirement, the worst abuse
regarding the doctrine may be curbed, i.e., its potential for inade-
quate implementation by too ready an assumption that an industry
leader is the sole available purchaser.
Finding alternative mergers is not usually a matter of primary
incentive to failing companies because the failing companies are
usually worth less to purchasers other than a major competitor; and
the difference is measured by the value of monopoly power. But the
"1
 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
17 ' See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971); Note,
68 Vale L.J. 1627, 1666-68 (1959).
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antitrust defendant now clearly carries the burden of proving the
absence of alternate purchasers and this allocation of the burden
should facilitate objective inquiry as to the existence of such pur-
chasers. Therefore, development of the "good faith purchaser" re-
quirement could remove pressure from the requirement of "failing"
because the burden of proving no alternative purchasers would have
to be carried before contesting "failing" issue. Since failing company
mergers with the sole available good faith purchaser have never
been shown to result in substantially greater anticompetitive effect
than allowing the failing company to fai1, 177 this development
would also diminish any hypothesized need for individual-case pub-
lic interest inquiries.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS
The last two sections of the article propose a model for business
failure, the Failing Company Model; a means of a statistical valida-
tion of the Model's predictive accuracy; and a decision framework
for using the Model to aid in deciding failing company doctrine
cases. The object of the proposed framework is to illustrate the steps
used by the Antitrust Division in deciding whether to grant a letter
of clearance for a failing company merger.
A. Definitions of Failing and Failure
The Failing Company Model has been developed to predict
failure as it was defined in International Shoe. Failing is considered
to be a grave probability of failure. However, the courts have never
stated the probability of failure, e.g., 90% or 95%, which constitutes
"failing."
Nevertheless, with regard to research design, the critical point
is not the meaning of the word "grave." A model can be built to
estimate probabilities between zero and 100%, and the level of
"grave" probability can be decided afterwards. The critical element
of the Model is the definition of failure, which is the event to be
predicted. The operational definition of failure is based on the
criteria of International Shoe, where failure was seen as evidenced
by an inability to pay debts as they come due, indicated by entrance
into a bankruptcy proceeding or an explicit agreement with creditors
to reduce debts. 178
77 Note, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 566 (1963). This conclusion assumes satisfaction of the
requirement that the sole purchaser had no anticompetitive intent, see text at note 39 supra,
as contrasted, for example, with evidence that the purchaser caused its prospective purchase
to become "failing," see discussion in note 82 supra, or foreclosed, by its pre-merger arrange-
ments, other offerors..See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 610 (6th Cir.
1970).
178 By contrast, forty years after International Shoe, Citizen Publishing hinted that mere
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B. The Failing Company Model
Selection of variables for the Failing Company Model is based
on a theory of the various ways that impending failure might be
symptomized by accounting and market data. The Failing Company
Model, summarized at Table 1, differs from models previously
discussed in the financial literature. In two senses the Model is more
TABLE 1. THE FAILING COMPANY MODEL
I. Liquidity:
A. Short-Run Liquidity
Flow:	 1. The "30-day flow" ratio' 79
Position:	 2. Net quick assets/inventory
B. Long-Run Liquidity
Flow:
	 3. Cash flow/total liabilities
Position:	 4. Net worth at fair market value/total liabilities- 1"
5. Net worth at book value/total liabilities
II. Profitability:	 6. Rate of return to common stockholders who invest for a
minimum of three years'B 1
III. Variability	 7. Standard deviation of net income over a period
8. Trend breaks for net incomem
9. Slope for net incOme" 3
10-12. Standard deviation, trend breaks, and slope of the ratio,
net quick assets to inventory; variables 10, 11, and 12
are only used at the first and second year before failure.
entrance to such proceedings may not suffice. 394 U.S. at 138. Definitions of failure may be
placed on a continuum, for example, ranging from a declining share of sales in major
markets, through omission of preferred dividends, to total dismantlement during liquidation
proceedings. On such a scale bankruptcy is not: the most extreme point because the possibility
of restoring the firm is not precluded. The impact of foreseeable changes in the legal definition
of failure would be a shift in weights assigned to the Failing Company Model variables, not a
change in the theoretical foundation. Of the failed firms studied, 90% filed petitions under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act. Private arrangements comprise the other 10%; state liquidations
were excluded for lack of data.
179
 Cash + Notes Receivable + Market Securities + (Annual Sales + 12) + ((Cost of
goods sold — Depreciation Expense + Selling and Administrative Expense + Interest) + 12).
I" Fair market value was measured by the harmonic mean of the bounds to the range of
stock prices during a year. The implicit weighting system of the harmonic mean is inverse to
the size of the observation (the reciprocal of 'the arithmetic average of reciprocals). Thus
speculative upsurges in market value will not be as influential as in the case of the arithmetic
mean.
"I The market rate of return accrues to a'common stockholder who bought his shares at
an average price at the beginning of a given time span (e.g., from the fifth to the first year
before failure) and sold them at an average price during the last year of the span. The rate of
return is based on the stockholder's gain or loss and cash dividends received, all adjusted for
temporal location by present-value analysis.
The internal rate of return to an investor and all variables using net worth at fair market
value were adjusted for capital changes. To compare entities more nearly similar, shares
issued in mergers or offered to the public were added to prior totals of shares outstanding,
with adjustments for stock splits and dividends.
" 2 A trend break is defined as any performance by a variable less favorable in one year
than in the preceding year, such as a decline in income from $10,000 to $1,000 from year 5 to
year 4 before failure.
1 B 3 Slope of a "trend" line fitted to the group of observations by the method of least
squares.
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dynamic than its predecessors: most of the variables incorporate
change over time, such as an investor's profit from selling a security
six years after purchase, and variability of accounting data, as
represented, for instance, by the standard deviation of net income.
C. Discriminant Analysis and Data Collection
Discriminant analysis is the statistical technique for testing the
hypothesis that the Failing Company Model can distinguish between
failing and non-failing firms.'" This statistical technique is used to
compute an index and a cut-off point on the index.
The index is derived from the financial model by computing the
values of each of the variables for each company studied. When the
variables for one company are standardized and added together,
their sum is that company's index score. A critical score exists and is
defined to be that index score which results in a minimum of
misclassification. If all companies with index scores above the criti-
cal score are predicted to succeed and all companies with scores
below are predicted to fail, erroneous predictions will be minimized.
Data drawn from financial statements and stock market prices
for a consecutive period of at least three years was gathered for all
one hundred and fifteen industrial firms which: (1) failed during the
years 1954-1968; (2) had full sets of data available; and (3) had a
minimum of $1,000,000 in liabilities at date of failure. The one
hundred and fifteen failed firms were paired with one hundred and
fifteen firms which did not fail, on the basis of four criteria—
industry, sales, employees and fiscal year. Pairing on such a
stratified, random basis eliminated an upward tendency in predic-
tive accuracy by excluding firms, such as General Motors or Alcoa,
which are unlikely to fail because of their size or industry.
D. Results
The model distinguished failing from nonfailing firms with an
accuracy of approximately 94 percent when failure occurred within
one year from the date of prediction, 80 percent for failure two years
into the future, and 70 percent for failure three, four and five years
distant.' Bs
1 " The Failing Company Model and the technique of discriminant analysis are also
explained in Blum, Failing Company Discriminant Analysis, 12 J. of Accounting
Research—(Scheduled to be published in 1974); Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine (1969)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business. The
dissertation topic was suggested by Edwin M. Zimmerman, then First Assistant to the
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.)
155
 There are two reasons for considering the Failing Company Model reliable. First, tne
choices of each of its variables are justified on the basis of financial theory, and, second the
aforementioned results are the product of a rigorous validation procedure. A discriminant
function was computed from the data of one half of the sample and tested on the other, or
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III. A DECISION PROCESS
A. The Antitrust Decision
This section relates the Failing Company Model to an explicit
decision process, illustrated by the Antitrust Division's decision
whether to grant a letter of clearance, 186 thereby clarifying am-
biguities that otherwise enshroud the apparently simple rule of the
doctrine. In particular, the nature of a "grave" probability of failure
will be clarified.
B. Design of a Decision Rule
The Failing Company Model results in a probability of success
or failure which then is subject to revision if additional information
is available. For example, if a probability of failure of 90% is
assigned by the model, it would be necessary to inquire whether
additional factors are present. For example, an unimpeachable re-
port by management consultants may expose details of the firm's
production line and market conditions that may incline the
decision-maker to revise the probability of failure. Or, an extraordi-
nary event, such as an uninsured fire loss may have occurred since
the last published financial statements.
Once the probability of failure has been estimated, a decision
may be made on the following basis: 187
L(F/NF) If	 x LR is greater than 	  predict failure;P(NF)
P(F)
	L(NF/F)
otherwise predict nonfailure.
1. Definition of P(F) and P(NF)
P(F) is the probability that a firm will fail; P(NF) is the proba-
bility that it will not. P(F) might be very small in the total popula-
tion, e.g., 1/1000. An estimate of P(F) must be made for every kind
"fresh," half. The secondary or "validation" sample provides a means for correcting sampling
error. It also provides a means for correcting the tendency of any statistic to be more accurate
in classifying the sample from which the statistic itself is derived (the primary sample) than in
classifying an untested, random sample, The computer program used was Duhammel, Massy,
and Morrison's adaptation of the Biomedical package program, 13MDO5M, developed at
Stanford University in 1964. See W. Dixon, BMD, Biomedical Computer Programs (1968).
136 A letter of clearance informs companies proposing to merge that the Antitrust
Division has no present intention to prosecute the merger.
237 Beaver, Financial Ratios as Preditors of Failure, Empirical Research in Accounting:
Selected Studies, 1966, J. of Accounting Research 71, 116-17, 124 (1967) (discussion after the
article); cf. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1329 (1971). In the latter article, the importance of a sound "prior" probability, which
in the above context is the probability assigned by the Failing Company Model before revision
based on additional date, is emphasized, Tribe, supra, 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 1358-59.
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of decision. Bankers making unsecured loans might face a P(F) of
111000. The Antitrust Division might have a P(F) of 1/5, that is, one
out of every five invocations of the failing company doctrine might
be made by a genuinely failing firm.
2. Definition of the Loss Ratio
The ratio on the right side of the inequality is the loss as-
sociated with Type II error (prediction of failure for a nonfailing
company) to the loss associated with error of Type I (prediction of
success for a failing company), or the relative structure of the costs
of error.
The legal literature has neglected these two types of errors. It
has emphasized the question of the net benefits of the failing com-
pany doctrine, i.e., the plus and minuses of allowing failing com-
panies to complete otherwise illegal mergers. Thus, the cost of Type
I error has been addressed only briefly, by focusing on the avoidance
of harm to failing companies by allowing the failing company de-
fense. The cost of Type II error has not been addressed directly in
the context of failing company doctrine literature. It is difficult to
quantify the true costs of error in every decision context. The
decision rule, though, does not depend on a complete quantification
of the cost of each type of error, but merely depends upon an
assignment of relative costs, such as "Type II error is twice as bad
as Type I."
3. LR as a Ratio of Probabilities
LR is the likelihood ratio in favor of failure. More specifically,
it is the ratio of the probability, as revised by any other available
information, that a given discriminant "Z" score (the index score)
will be associated with a failing company to the probability that the
"Z" will be associated with a nonfailing company. Algebraically,
LR P(Z/F) P(Z/NF). "LR*" is the critical value of LR that must
be exceeded for failure to be predicted, once P(F) and the loss ratio are
given.
4. Illustration
To illustrate the decision, let us assume that the loss ratio is 2:1;
one-fifth of the population of failing company doctrine applicants is
truly failing; the Failing Company Model predicted failure within
the next year for a certain applicant; Company X; and further
information does not result in revision of the probability assigned by
the Failing Company Model.
The critical value of the likelihood ratio is then:
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— L(NF/F)	 P(NF)	 1	 47.-5
If the likelihood ratio for Company X is greater than 8, failure
should be predicted and X should be allowed to invoke the failing
company doctrine. Since the Failing Company Model predicted
Company X to fail, let us assign the expected probability of Type I
found by the Model. Type I accuracy (predicting failing firms to fail,
P(Z/F)) was 95%. 188 The likelihood ratio of Company X (LR„) is
then:
P(Z/F).95
LTC
 P(Z/NF) — .05 — 19
Since LR„ [19] is greater than LR* [8], Company X should be
predicted to fail and the failing company doctrine should be al-
lowed.
If it is assumed that Company X was predicted not to fail
within one year, but it was predicted to fail within two years with a
probability of Type II error of 25%, LR* remains the same. How-
ever, the new likelihood ratio for. Company X (LR„) is:
P(Z(F))	 .75 _LRIx — 	  _P(Z(NF))	 .25	 3
This is less than LR* and the failing company doctrine would not be
allowed. 189
In summary, here are the main steps in the decision process
proposed for the Antitrust Division:
1. Ascertain the frequency of failed firms in the population of
applicants for the failing company doctrine (assumed in the example
above to be 1/5). This statistic would require revision from time to
time, but not for any particular applicant.
2. Estimate the loss ratio: the relative cost of Type II error
LR* L(F/NF)	 P(F)  _ 2 . 1/5
188 The overall accuracy (94%) of the model, the combination of Type I and II, was
reported in text at note 185 supra.
189
 To illustrate the nature of the decision rule further, let us consider the decision of a
financier of accounts receivable who faces a P(F) of 1121 and a relative cost of error of 1:10.
Then
	LR"= 1	 20/21x 	 =2.
	
10	 1/21
Assume that he has no information other than that of the Failing Company Model, and that
P(Z/F) equals .6 and LR equals .61.4, or 1.50. The financier will make the loan. He could
compute the probability of failure which has to be exceeded in order to disqualify for a loan
as: P(Z/F) = 2; P(ZIF) + P(Z/NF) = 1; (P(Z/F) = 213 = 67%.
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(assumed in the example to be 2:1). This statistic could be revised
from time to time if antitrust policies change, and it could also be
revised for individual cases.
3. Since steps one and two suffice to determine the critical
likelihood ratio (LR*), which in effect determines the cut-off point
for "grave" probability of failure, all that remains is to evaluate the
likelihood ratio for a particular applicant for the defense (such as
LR„ for Company X above). The first step in this evaluation is to
find the probability assigned by the Failing Company Model. The
second step is to revise this probability on the basis of additional
information not focused upon by the model.
C. Explicit Recognition of the "Grave" Probability
In view of this probabilistic decision-rule a novel definition of
"failing" can be advanced to show not only the complexity of the
concept "failing," but also the steps required to achieve a complete
definition.
It is unnecessary to decide, for instance, whether .90 or .99 is
the cut-off point constituting "grave" probability. One could instead
estimate values for the two parameters—relative frequency of failing
companies and relative cost of error—since they suffice to determine
the critical value of the likelihood ratio. The two parameters may be
difficult to ascertain, but the analysis can be approached explicitly,
avoiding undiscussed assumptions:
(1) The relative frequency of failing companies among the
population of cases of applicants for the failing company doctrine
could be estimated by an empirical investigation. Some approxima-
tion could be arrived at, for instance, either a relative frequency of
10% or an estimate of a range—such as 5% to 15%.
(2) Relative costs of error, while more challenging, are assessed
every day in the legal environment as "public-interest balances" and
in economics as "cost-benefit" analyses)"
D. Conclusion
The explicit nature of the decision-rule emphasizes the complex-
ity of the concept—"grave" probability of failure. Furthermore, it
shows for the first time in what way a thorough assessment of
"grave" probability can be made. This emphasis should not daunt
decision-makers, because the difficulties it focuses upon exist in all
decisions regarding public policy)"
The failing company doctrine throughout its history to date has
199
 G. Taylor, Managerial and Engineering Economy 386-392 (1964). See also W.
Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 479-490 (2d ed. 1965).
191
 See, C. Churchman, Theory of Experimental Interference 265-87 (1948).
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been interpreted as an absolute defense, and application of the
doctrine has implicitly required a public interest balance, that is, a
single balance applied to all failing company cases. The FTC and
recent lower court decisions have experimented with requiring indi-
vidual public-interest balances for each case, a most exhausting
endeavor which would undoubtedly be difficult of fulfillment in the
usual case. A middle approach, for which there is some foundation
in current case development, would establish different public-
interest balances for different markets. 192
To be of practical value in guiding failing company mergers,
and thus obviating litigation, a set of predictable rules should be
established.' 93 This is not possible with the FTC's approach. It is
possible with regard to the other two above approaches, but only if
antitrust agencies publish guidelines with explicit, quantified
public-interest standards. In conjunction with such standards, con-
crete guidelines should also be issued in order to define the steps
required to prove absence of alternative good faith purchasers.
These guidelines would assist in accomplishing the purposes of the
failing company doctrine: aiding market exit and entry; and grant-
ing mercy to failing companies—without significant risk of anti-
trust abuses and without the need to litigate in all but the most
unusual cases.' 94
192 See notes 100-14 supra. Legislative support for different standards in different mar-
kets is also implicit in the exception for the newspaper industry, See text at notes 89-92 supra.
193 See note 142 supra and discussion following note 71 supra.
194
 See note 177 supra.
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